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Abstract 
Establishing the time at which a particular event 
happened is a fundamental concern when relating 
cause and effect in any forensic investigation. 
Reliance on computer generated timestamps for 
correlating events is complicated by uncertainty as 
to clock skew and drift, environmental factors such 
as location and local time zone offsets, as well as 
human factors such as clock tampering. 
Establishing that a particular computer’s temporal 
behaviour was consistent during its operation 
remains a challenge. The contributions of this 
paper are both a description of assumptions 
commonly made regarding the behaviour of clocks 
in computers, and empirical results demonstrating 
that real world behaviour diverges from the 
idealised or assumed behaviour. We present an 
approach for inferring the temporal behaviour of a 
particular computer over a range of time by 
correlating commonly available local machine 
timestamps with another source of timestamps. We 
show that a general characterisation of the passage 
of time may be inferred from an analysis of 
commonly available browser records. 
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Digital Evidence, 
Event Correlation, Reverse Engineering, Timestamp 
Interpretation 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The use of timestamps in digital investigations is 
pervasive. Timestamps are increasingly used to 
relate events which happen in the digital realm to 
each other and to events which happen in the 
physical realm, helping to establish cause and 
effect. A well known difficulty with timestamps 
however is how to interpret and relate the 
timestamps generated by separate computer clocks 
when they are not synchronized [11]. Commonly 
observed differences in time occur from computer 
to computer due both to location specific time 
variations (such as time zones) and also due to the 
rate of drift of the hardware clocks in modern 
computers. 
Current approaches to inferring the real world 
interpretation of timestamps assume idealised 
models of computer clock time, eschewing 
influences such as synchronisation and deliberate 
clock tampering. For example, in order to determine 
the clock skew of a computer being seized, it is 
commonly recommended that a record be made “of 
the CMOS time on seized or examined system units 
in relation to actual time, obtainable using radio 
signal clocks or via the Internet using reliable time 
servers.”[1]. CERT recommend that, “As you 
collect a suspicious systems current date, time and 
command history … determine if there is any 
discrepancy between the collected time and date 
and the actual time and date within your time zone” 
[3].  
While this approach will approximately identify 
the skew between the local time and the observed 
computer time at the time of the check, it says 
nothing about the passage of time on the computer’s 
clock prior to that point [13]. Uncertainty remains 
as to the behaviour of the clock of the suspect 
computer prior to seizure. 
In this paper we explore two themes related to 
this uncertainty. Firstly, we investigate whether it is 
reasonable to assume uniform behaviour of 
computer clocks over time, and test these 
assumptions by attempting to characterise how 
computer clocks behave in the wild. Secondly, we 
investigate the feasibility of automatically 
identifying the local time on a computer by 
correlating timestamps embedded in digital 
evidence with corroborative time sources.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents an account of background material related 
to timekeeping and computer clocks. An experiment 
studying the behaviour the local clocks in a 
computer network is presented in section 3, together 
with an analysis of results. A second experiment 
attempting to identify a reliable means of inferring a 
suspect computer’s timescale is then presented in 
section 4. This experiment uses the results from 
section 3 as baseline for comparison with the results 
generated by two correlation algorithms. Finally the 
two correlation algorithms are compared and 
conclusions drawn in section 5 of the paper. 
2 BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK 
This section provides a brief introduction to the 
fundamentals of keeping time with computer clocks 
in our current era. The section concludes with a 
discussion of related work regarding the use of 
timestamps in forensics.  
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2.1 An introduction to computer timekeeping 
A battery powered Real Time Clock (RTC) 
(also called BIOS or CMOS clock) is used to keep 
time while a computer is switched off. While the 
RTC is used as the basis for determining time when 
the computer boots, the interpretation of said time is 
operating system specific. For example, the family 
of Windows operating systems interpret the RTC as 
civil time, whereas the Linux operating system may 
interpret the RTC as either civil time or UTC by 
configuration.  
Commonly, UNIX operating systems implement 
a software clock (called the system clock) by setting 
a counter from the RTC at boot, and employ a 
hardware timer (such as RTC timer interrupts, an 
APIC or other means) as an oscillator. Stevens 
suggests that all instances of the Windows OS base 
their timescale on the RTC throughout operation 
[11]. However, there is evidence to suggest that, 
similar to UNIX implementations, Windows 2000 
and above similarly employ a software clock rather 
than use the RTC directly [8, 9, 10]. 
2.2 Reliable time synchronisation 
PC Clocks are commonly known to be 
inaccurate, due to the inherent instability of the 
crystal oscillators with which clocks are 
implemented. These vary widely due to 
temperature, voltage and noise [5]. Since the late 
1980’s, significant effort has been invested in the 
development of techniques for obtaining reliable 
sources of time via directly connected atomic 
clocks,  radio clocks, GPS and the Network Time 
Protocol (NTP). As far back as 1994, researchers 
were demonstrating synchronisation of computer 
clocks to an accuracy of 10 ms across the Pacific 
Ocean using NTP [6]. Today, system clocks on the 
UNIX platform are able to be synchronised to 
reliable time sources on a nanosecond scale. 
NTP is the most prevalent method of time 
synchronisation on UNIX hosts. From Windows 
2000 onwards, Microsoft has included in their 
operating systems a restricted version of NTP, 
called Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP). 
While it is protocol compatible with NTP, SNTP 
does not implement the clock discipline algorithms 
present in the former, and is not capable of 
delivering the same degree of precision. 
The degree to which reliable network time may 
be utilized by a particular PC running Windows 
varies. By default, Windows 2000 workstations 
have the SNTP service switched off, while 
Windows XP workstations by default will 
synchronize with an SNTP service hosted at 
time.windows.com once every week. Both 2000 and 
XP workstations in a domain network will however 
synchronize via SNTP from the Domain Controller.  
In theory then, stand alone Windows XP 
workstations will become synchronized with civil 
time by use of SNTP once a week. Stand alone 
Windows 2000 PC’s will likely drift away from 
civil time. 
2.3 Factors affecting timekeeping accuracy 
A number of interrelated factors influence the 
accuracy of both timekeeping on computers, and the 
interpretation of timestamps sourced from them. We 
summarise these below: 
System clock implementation As discussed 
previously, the quartz crystals used as oscillators in 
computers are notoriously unstable. Implementing 
the correct local time offsets for civil time is 
complicated by changes in region specific time 
zones. Recent evidence for the importance of this 
may be illustrated by the flurry of patches related to 
the Melbourne Commonwealth Games daylight 
savings time extension in early 2006 [14].  
Clock configuration It is common to see 
Windows workstations with the time zone set to the 
default installation time zone. Another clock 
configuration error is the commonly occurring 
example of systems where the BIOS time has not 
been correctly set.  
Tampering The practise of setting computer 
clocks back or forward for reasons such as evading 
digital rights management or misdirection of 
investigation is often referred to as tampering. 
Timestamps, like any data are subject to the 
possibility of deliberate modification. 
Synchronisation Protocol The Windows time 
synchronisation protocol is based on SNTP and is 
only designed to keep computers synchronised to 
within 2 seconds in a particular site and 20 seconds 
within a distributed enterprise. Computers using 
NTP and SNTP without cryptographic 
authentication are subject to protocol based attacks.  
Misinterpretation Timestamps are related to a 
particular frame of reference, and their correct 
interpretation requires knowledge of that context. 
For example, in order to interpret at what time an 
Internet Explorer timestamp corresponds to in the 
civil time where it was generated, one needs to 
know the time zone offset. Other sources of 
uncertainty are the ambiguity as to what point in 
time the timestamp refers to for a particular event – 
is it the start time or the end time of the event - and 
was the timestamp generated at the time of the event 
or the time of writing to the event log. 
Bugs Software errors in the implementation of 
software clocks or the timestamp serialisation 
algorithm have the potential for adversely affecting 
timekeeping accuracy. 
2.4 Usage of timestamps in forensics 
Aside from the comprehensive study of 
computer time behaviour on UNIX systems done in 
the context of developing the NTP infrastructure 
[5,6], to the best of our knowledge there has been 
little research in either characterising the behaviour 
of the timescale of unsynchronised Windows 
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computers, or on automated means of identifying 
the timescale. 
In the computer forensics literature, timelining is 
often referenced as an important tool in determining 
cause and effect. Stephens has proposed a model 
and algorithm for relating timestamps taken from 
multiple timelines [11]. In this model, a base clock 
is set to UTC, and subordinate clocks are defined in 
terms of skews from parent clocks with additional 
skews further generated from time drift rates.  
Gladyshev and Patel propose using 
corroborating sources of time to find the bounds of 
events with uncertain time, defining both a 
formalism and an algorithm for relating events with 
uncertain times [2]. Their approach differs from 
ours in that we deal predominately with certain 
times, but uncertain skew. 
Weil argues for dynamic analysis of the 
temporal behaviour of suspect systems, proposing 
correlation of timestamps embedded within locally 
cached web pages with the modified and accessed 
times (MAC times) of the cached files [13].  
2.5 Relation to existing work 
Our work has similar objectives but differs 
significantly from Weil in two respects. Firstly, we 
investigate to what degree timescales are unstable. 
Secondly, Weil’s approach relies on manual 
classification of cached web pages as dynamically 
or statically generated. This is due to the technique 
relying specifically on dynamic content in order for 
the embedded timestamps to be interpreted. In 
addition, we also present two algorithms which 
enable the automatic determination of the behaviour 
of a suspect computer’s clock by comparison with a 
commonly logged corroborative source.  
3 CHARACTERISING THE BEHAVIOUR OF 
DRIFTING CLOCKS 
Having enumerated the main factors influencing 
the temporal behaviour of the clock of a computer, 
we attempt here to experimentally validate whether 
one can make informed assumptions about such 
behaviour. We do this by empirically studying the 
temporal behaviour of a network of computers 
found in the wild. 
The subject of our case study is a network of 
machines in active use by a small business. The 
network consists of a Windows 2000 domain, 
consisting of one Windows 2000 server, and a 
mixed number of Windows XP and 2000 
workstations. Access to the internet is provided by a 
Linux based firewall. In this case, the Windows 
2000 Domain Controller (DC) (the server) has not 
been configured to synchronize with any reliable 
time source, and as such has been drifting away 
from the civil timescale for some time. The Linux 
firewall also provides both a squid1 web proxy 
server, and an NTP server, which is synchronised 
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 http://www.squid-cache.org/ 
with a stratum 2 NTP server2. All workstations are 
configured to use the squid proxy cache for web 
access. 
Our goal here is to observe both the temporal 
behaviour of the DC, and the effects of 
synchronization on the subordinate workstation 
computers. We would expect that the timescales of 
the workstation computers would approximate that 
of the DC, due to the use of SNTP in this network 
arrangement (see section 2.3). 
In order to observe this behaviour, we have 
constructed a simple service that logs both the 
system time of a host computer and the civil time 
for the location, which we obtain via SNTP from 
the local NTP server. The program samples both 
sources of time and logs the results to a file. 
The logging program was deployed on all 
workstations and the server on the 1st February 
2006, and the results checked mid March. 
Unfortunately, the program was rendered short 
lived, as a particular bug in the Windows service 
implementation of Python (the implementation 
language) saw the log service crash after writing 4k 
of debug messages to the standard output steam. On 
fixing the bug, a new version was redeployed in the 
21st March, 2006 for 20 days, and then results 
collected.  
3.1 Discussion of results 
The graphs presented below are based on the 
sampled timescales taken from machines in the 
subject network. The x-axis is the time and date of 
the sample, taken from the civil timescale, as served 
by the NTP server. The y-axis is the difference in 
time between the system time and civil time at that 
moment, in seconds.  
Figure 1 is the graph of results taken from the 
domain controller of the Windows 2000 server 
based network.  The solid line of samples shows a 
uniform drift of the system time away from civil 
time for the time period 21st March through 10th 
April. The other two sets of samples from the 1st 
February through the 21st March 2006 are samples 
taken by the initial version of the program in the 
time after a boot (before the program crashed). 
Extrapolating the solid line shows the drift of the 
server to be at a near uniform rate. 
Figure 2 shows results taken from a Windows 
2000 workstation called Florence over the same 
period. It displays a general time drift trend which 
correlates3 with the domain controller. The faulty 
logging service has generated far more samples than 
were generated in the case of the server. This is due 
to the habitual shutting down of the computer by the 
user at the end of each work day, resulting in a 
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 Stratum refers to the distance from a reference 
clock.  
3
 In this paper we use the word correlate to 
indicate a correspondence between two measured 
properties. We do not subscribe to the statistical 
meaning of the word. 
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number of samples generated every time the 
machine reboots (before the initial version of the 
program crashes). 
 
Figure 1: Clock skew of Domain Controller 
"Rome" offset from civil time. 
 
Figure 2: Clock skew of workstation "Florence" 
offset from civil time. 
The scale of the graph is misleading as to the 
number of outlier values present from 8:19:34AM 
through 8:25:56AM on the 20th February. The cross 
at 0 skew actually represents 38 outlier values, 
which do not fit a model of time where the clock is 
synchronised to the DC. It seems highly irregular 
that during this period the machine became 
synchronized to within one second of Civil Time (a 
time stream which the network in question has no 
configured reference to).  
The default auditing configuration of the 
Windows network did not include the necessary 
privilege to identify whether this was user 
instigated. However, the accuracy to which the 
clock became synchronised with civil time leads us 
to suspect that this was not the result of user 
interaction; rather that it was the action of some 
program which had access to an external, reliable 
time source. The Windows update service was 
active during this period; however we have no 
evidence to support the theory that this was the 
cause of synchronisation with the Civil Timescale 
during this period. 
The graph presented in Figure 3 shows the skew 
data taken from a Windows XP workstation named 
Milan.4 Again the drift rate generally remains 
constant, and correlated with that of the server; 
however there are two sets of anomalies which 
deviate from this general trend. Immediately 
noticeable are the almost vertical lines which 
indicate a resynchronisation with the DC timescale 
from wide time skews. Rebooting the computer The 
second anomaly is the two peaks on the graph 
around the 6th and 7th April. 
On closer investigation, the vertical line on the 
3rd of March reveals that over a period of 44 
minutes and 50 seconds of real time, the system 
clock only advanced 43 minutes 42 seconds. In total 
the system clock loses 1 minuted 8 seconds over 
this period. Clearly, any timestamps generated 
during this period will be unreliable.  
 
Figure 3: Clock skew of workstation "Milan" 
offset from civil time (zoomed). 
A recent check of this workstation’s RTC via 
the BIOS configuration interface revealed that RTC 
was minutes ahead of the system time measured just 
moments before. It would appear from this that 
either Windows XP does not update the RTC, or 
that update of this particular RTC failed. 
Interestingly, we see similar behaviour for the PC 
named “Trieste” (shown below in Figure 4) which 
is the only other Windows XP host on the network. 
All four other workstations (which are running 
Windows 2000) do not exhibit this behaviour.  The 
near linear relationship of the lower ends of the 
vertical reboot lines may indicate the rough drift of 
the RTC.5 
                                                           
4
 The scale of this graph differs from the 
previous graphs in order to present a more clear 
view of the features in discussion. We note that the 
overall form of the graph when taken at the 
previous scale follows the same gradient and offset.  
5
 As the focus of this section is on describing 
observed deviations of Windows based clocks from 
the ideal, we leave experiments which conclusively 
determine the behaviour of the Windows XP clock 
at boot to others.  
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Figure 4: Clock skew of workstation “Trieste” 
offset from civil time. 
The graph labelled Figure 5 represents a 
combination of data from the DC and Milan about 
the period where peaks are seen in the skew graph. 
We can see here that the DC was maintaining a 
stable timescale (part of its data is showing through 
under the peak) for the period while Milan began 
drifting away from the timescale of the DC. At the 
start of the peak we can see that Milan began 
drifting away from the DC at a rate of around 1 
second every 14 minutes, before re-synchronising 
with the DC.  
 
Figure 5: Clock skew of "Rome" vs. "Milan" 
offset from civil time (zoomed). 
Investigation of the event logs of the computer 
revealed an inordinate number of Print subsystem 
warning events in the system logs (which appeared 
to indicate repeated retries of installation of a print 
driver) before this time. No other events of interest 
were found. This drift is unlikely to have been 
based on a single operator action, as the 
corresponding change in skew would have been 
immediately visible, with a discontinuity between 
the two points. 
The remaining three workstations stayed 
synchronised with the DC, with no temporal 
anomalies observed. The skew timelines for these 
were similar to Figure 1. For reasons of brevity they 
are not reproduced here.  
From these results we make a number of 
conclusions.  
In general, we find that Windows hosts (2K and 
XP) integrated with a Windows based time 
synchronisation network will stay synchronised. 
However, the anomalies observed above indicate 
that making reliable statements about the timescale 
of a particular workstation computer within a 
Windows Domain network (and as such the 
interpretation of timestamps from these 
workstations) is problematic. 
Windows computers not in a Domain network, 
either tethered to a reliable source of time, or 
loosely tethered (such as computers running the XP 
OS) may suffer from the same problem. The 
observation that the host “Milan” became 
synchronised with civil time for a period, and the 
further observation of it drifting away from the DC 
timescale and civil time (for no observable reasons) 
indicate that other factors are influencing the 
behaviour of the clock. 
4 IDENTIFYING COMPUTER TIMESCALES 
BY CORRELATION WITH 
CORROBORATING SOURCES 
Given our uncertainty with respect to the 
timescale of a particular computer, we seek 
automated methods for identifying the temporal 
behaviour. In this section we describe an automated 
approach which correlates timestamped events 
found on a suspect computer with timestamped 
events from a more reliable, corroborating source.  
Web browser records are increasingly employed 
as evidence in investigations, and are a rich source 
of timestamped data. The corresponding ISP side 
records which correspond to these are proxy logs. 
We expect that the common practise of deploying 
transparent proxies by ISP’s will see these logs also 
increasingly used.  
Due to the increasing ubiquity of web browsers 
we have chosen to use the web browser and proxy 
records as data sources for use in identifying 
temporal behaviour. We expect here that in the 
process of an investigation, proxy logs which relate 
to a suspect computer may be obtained from the ISP 
which has served as the computer’s gateway to the 
Internet.  
We assume that these records on the proxy 
would be produced by a computer which is 
synchronized with an accurate time source. (While 
this might not currently be a safe assumption, we 
look towards a near future where the provenance of 
audit records receives closer attention).  
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Figure 6: Matching is complicated by only the most recent record present in the history. 
The web browser records are from the target 
computer, of uncertain behaviour which is to be 
clarified. For this particular experiment we consider 
the records generated by the Internet Explorer (IE) 
web browser prevalent on Microsoft operating 
systems, along with the proxy logs created by the 
squid proxy cache.  
IE stores records of browsing access in two 
subsystems: the cache and history. These records 
are all stored in separate files, all called index.dat, 
but located in different directories.  
The IE cache subsystem stores locally cached 
copies of web content, such as pages and images. 
An index is kept mapping web addresses to these 
locally stored copies in a file called index.dat. The 
cache index files contain entries for all cacheable 
resources visited, including component files of a 
particular viewable page (for example, images, 
sounds, flash animations, etc). 
The history subsystem creates a historical record 
of pages visited over time in a set of index.dat files. 
Three separate types of history files are kept: the 
root history, daily sort history and weekly sort 
history. Within these files are records of visits to 
top level viewable pages: 
• Pages visited by typing a URL 
• Pages visited by clicking on a hypertext 
link 
• Documents opened within Windows 
explorer clicking (i.e. .xls, .doc…) 
The cache and history index.dat files are all of a 
similar undocumented binary file format. Despite 
the lack of documentation, there exist a number of 
documented analyses of reverse engineering the file 
format, and a number of tools are available which 
will interpret the content of this file. For a good 
description of the file format, especially notable in 
distinguishing some subtle semantic differences in 
interpreting the timestamps in these records, see [1].  
We initially used the Pasco [4] tool for 
extracting the data contained in these files. We 
chose this tool due to its freely available source 
code. In practise we suspected that it was generating 
spurious results. This prompted us to perform our 
own reverse engineering effort. Our new tool 
identified a bug in the Pasco tool where a spurious 
record was generated due to an unchecked file read 
for an offset outside the bounds of the file6. 
The squid proxy cache logs a record of all web 
transactions which it processes in a file called 
access.log. This is a textual log file. The fields of 
interest to us are the resource access time (which, 
similar to the IE index files is the end of the 
transaction), and the URL visited.  
4.1 Challenges in correlating these sources 
Our experiment involved translating the web 
browser records and squid logs into a common 
representation and matching entries from both 
sources based on the URL visited. We assume that 
the last accessed time from the squid record is in 
fact civil time (kept tightly synchronised using, for 
example, NTP), and compare that time with the last 
accessed time from the corresponding history or 
cache record.  
The primary challenge related to correlation is 
in determining which entry in the squid cache log 
corresponds to a particular entry in the cache or 
history records. As IE records are most recently 
used records (MRU), there will not be a one to one 
mapping between history entries and squid events. 
We illustrate this with the following example.  
Figure 6 depicts the relationship between 
records of visits to a particular page over two days. 
On the first day, the user has visited the site once, 
and on the second day has visited the site a further 
three times. However, as the history is a MRU 
record, the visits at 7:00 and 7:36 are effectively 
forgotten from the IE history, with the visit at 8:21 
being the only record left for that day. Simple 
matching based on the URL field of each record 
will result in 4 potential matches for each history 
file record. The addition of further history records 
and cache records related to visits to this URL 
complicates the matter even further. Our correlation 
approach must in this case determine which 
potential match is the correct match. 
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 Our new parsing tool, imaginatively named 
pasco2, is available at 
http://www.bschatz.org/2006/pasco2/  
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4.2 Evaluation methodology 
For the two algorithms explored, the sampled 
timescales from the previous experiment in Section 
3 are used as a baseline for determining which 
matches are true or false. True positives are data 
points output by the correlation algorithm which 
correlate with the timescale identified in section 3. 
False positives are matches generated by the 
algorithm which do not correlate with the timescale. 
True negatives are prospective matches that are 
rightly discarded by the algorithm, while false 
negatives are data points which would correlate 
with the timescale, but the algorithm classifies or 
misidentifies as not correlated.    
4.3 Clickstream correlation algorithm 
Our initial approach to correlation is based on 
the concept of clickstream. We borrow this term 
from the web content industry, where it refers to the 
path taken by an individual visitor navigating a 
website in a particular session. Our hypothesis was 
that for a particular clickstream, the time periods 
between hits (visits to a particular URL) would 
form a unique signature.  
We define a clickstream as a time ordered 
sequence of page hits within a website. The intra-
hit time is the time period between two successive 
page hit events in a clickstream. We limit the 
definition of clickstream such the intra-hit time for 
successive hits is within max seconds of each other 
and further than min seconds apart. We define a 
maximum limit so that we may disambiguate 
sessions. The function of the minimum is described 
further below. Finally, the dimensions of a 
clickstream are the ordered set of intra-hit times. 
The algorithm attempts to fit clickstreams 
identified in the web browser records to the squid 
event stream to corresponding events in the squid 
logs. The heuristic here is that the longer the 
clickstream, the more unique the dimensions of it 
will be, thus giving a single unique match when 
fitting to the other event stream.  
Figure 7 and 8 are of a clickstream correlation 
run, graphed with the timescale log of the 
workstation “Milan”. The clickstream correlation 
dataset in Figure 7 contains 75 results, of which we 
can see 4 clusters of results7. Clearly there is 
conflicting data. The two clusters visible but not on 
the timeline actually contain 5 false positive values 
which are causing the problem. Removing these 
false positives from the result set results in the 
graph labelled Figure 8, where we can see tight 
correlation with the workstation’s timescale. 
The results of running the same correlation 
algorithm on the host “Pompeii” which has 
generated far less web traffic over the period is 
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 We note here that a colour graph would be 
more illuminating, as the timeline values on the 
graph dominate. 
presented in Figure 9. In this case the clickstream 
correlation algorithm produces no false positives. 
 
Figure 7: Correlated skew vs. experimental skew 
for host “Milan” do not correlate due to 
presence of false positives. 
 
Figure 8: Correlated skew vs. experimental skew 
for host “Milan” correlates when false positives 
are removed. 
 
Figure 9: "Pompeii" cache correlation. 
4.4 Results  
In practise the rate of false positives increased 
when comparing intra-hit times at magnitudes 
below the magnitude of one second. We expect that 
this is due to the measurement error being more 
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pronounced the smaller the intra-hit time becomes.  
Values of around 20 minutes for the maximum 
intra-hit time and values of over 1 second for the 
minimum value, produced clickstreams with the 
best uniqueness properties (as measured by 
reduction in rate of false positives). 
Modifying the algorithm to filter clickstream 
acceptance based on clickstream length produced a 
similar effect on false positive rate, and 
consequently a high rate of false negatives for 
clickstreams of larger size. With larger sized 
clickstreams the rate of true positives falls off 
quickly however, and the rate of false negatives 
becomes high.  
The algorithm performed far better on cache 
records than on history records. We expect that this 
is due to the difference in granularity of record 
keeping in the sources. As the cache stores cache 
records both for top level web pages and 
component content such as images, style sheets and 
the like, clickstreams are more likely to be formed. 
The IE history subsystem only records the top level 
page views, so is less likely to produce long 
clickstreams in situations users do not heavily 
explore websites. 
Designing an algorithm which eliminates these 
false positives is complicated by the fact that the 
last access timestamp of any particular cache record 
is unreliable, as it may have been accessed more 
recently by the user (before the cached content 
expired). In this case, no corresponding squid event 
would be logged, thus introducing a skew to the 
expected offset of the matching squid event.  
For this reason, we set about identifying a means 
of identifying IE records which must have been 
requested via the squid proxy and not from the local 
cache. 
4.5 Non-cached records correlation algorithm  
After some further investigation, documentation 
of another effort at reverse engineering the 
index.dat format came to light [12]. This work 
identified another field in the IE History record 
which recorded the total number of accesses to a 
particular web resource. For records where this field 
has a value of one, we can be sure that there has 
only been one access and that the record has come 
directly via the squid proxy.  
Our new algorithm reduces uncertainty by 
choosing only history records which must have 
come directly via squid, bypassing the local cache. 
Furthermore it places a high value on matching 
entries for which there exists only one 
corresponding match in the squid log.  
The algorithm is defined as follows: All 
potential matches of non-cached history records are 
found. A subset of these, called the basis set is 
identified, where for each history record, only one 
corresponding squid match is found. We call the set 
of remaining potential matches the remainder set. 
The basis set mean is the mean of the skews of each 
match in the basis set. 
We further cluster the remainder set based on 
the history record common to potential matches. 
For each of these clusters, we find the potential 
match with a skew closest to the basis set mean, and 
add it to the initially empty inferred set, discarding 
the rest. The results of this algorithm are the union 
of the basis set and the inferred set. 
4.6 Results 
In practise this algorithm produces a set of data 
which correlates well with the timescales produced 
by our previous experiment. For example, Figure 10 
is a graph of the output of the algorithm described 
above overlaid over the timescale for host Milan 
obtained from the previous experiment.  
Of 1188 unique history records, 821 potential 
matches were identified. One would expect that the 
number of potential matches would be higher, 
however URL’s with encoded GET requests are not 
matched due to squid’s anonymised logging of this 
type of URL.  
In practise there are a significantly high 
proportion of non-cached hits in the history for our 
algorithm to work effectively. The algorithm 
identifies 304 potential non-cached matches, and a 
basis set of 110 matches from this. In total the 
algorithm generates 134 data points.  
 
Figure 10: History Correlation vs. Timescale. 
Comparison with the sampled timescale reveals 
numerous false positives (around 15-20) for which 
we have no explanation. On close examination, a 
number of data points were identified which 
correlated with the vertical sections immediately 
after reboots. 
We are confident that the algorithm generates 
many false negatives due to its simplicity in 
selecting non-cached hits for the basis set. A more 
comprehensive algorithm would in addition to 
finding history records with an accessed count of 1, 
use the temporal ordering relationship between the 
history record sets. For example, say the oldest 
weekly sort file contains a record for a particular 
URL with accessed count equal to one. If a newer 
sort file contains a record for the same URL visit, 
with an accessed count of two then one can be sure 
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that this record to correspond to a non-cached 
access. 
4.7 Discussion 
In this section the two algorithms are compared, 
and the general problems related to correlating 
these types of event logs are outlined.   
Of the two algorithms, the history correlation 
algorithm performed the best. Results are generated 
which cover a far wider period of time than the 
cache oriented algorithm, giving greater insights 
into the temporal behaviour of the computer. 
Furthermore the ratio of true to false positives is far 
higher.  
The history algorithm was originally the worst 
performing of the two approaches. At that point in 
time, determining whether the high rate of false 
positives was due to a tool implementation error or 
an error in the correlation algorithm was 
problematic.  Boyd’s paper [1] was at that point in 
time essential in identifying that our interpretation 
of the weekly history timestamps was mistaken.  
Despite having re-implemented a new set of 
index.dat file parsers, (and discovered a third 
timestamp in the history records8), we still used the 
semantics defined by the pasco tool. Our model was 
corrected to treat the first timestamp in the weekly 
sort history record as the accessed time, offset by 
the local time zone offset in operation. This resulted 
in the high rate of positives and a low rate of false 
positives previously seen in Figure 10.  
Both approaches to developing a correlation 
algorithm outlined above make a closed world 
assumption – that the algorithm has access to all of 
the information that it needs. In practise, 
development of the algorithm was complicated by 
this not being the case. Consider for example Figure 
11. This graph was generated using the same history 
correlation algorithm as that seen in Figure 10. 
Strong correlation with the computer’s timescale is 
evident; however, there are in this case false 
positives in the extremes of the graph. 
Examination of the false positives indicated that 
they were related to records from a particular squid 
access log. This access log had not been included in 
the correlation run for processing speed reasons. 
The omission of the records resulted in the 
algorithm picking a match from another squid log 
file, resulting in a far greater offset. Adding the 
excluded log produces the results seen previously in 
Figure 10. 
                                                           
8
 A 32bit MSDOS timestamp was identified at 
offset 0x50h within the history record. Within the 
root history file, interpretation of this timestamp is 
the last accessed time, as is apparent by comparing 
the last access time in the Internet Explorer history 
viewer. In practise, the value is always a small 
amount after the 64bit FileTime based last accessed 
time.  
 
Figure 11: Incomplete information 
There is another problem related to the closed 
world assumption. By assuming that all data is 
present, we assume a perfectly functioning logging 
system in Internet Explorer and Squid.  
The corollary of this assumption is that we 
assume a perfect implementation for our index.dat 
parser and that we have interpreted the semantics of 
the records correctly, and also avoided bugs in our 
implementation. Clearly, this is not valid given the 
challenges in reverse engineering the file format and 
allowing for inevitable bugs. We expect that the 
false positives present in the history correlation 
algorithm are attributable to these. 
Despite the challenges outlined above in 
correlating IE History and Cache records with squid 
access logs, we find that we are able to correlate the 
records to a dataset which correlates reasonably 
with the timestreams sampled from the first 
experiment.  
We expect far higher rates of true positives are 
possible; both algorithms ignore large parts of the 
dataset, as our heuristics and rules only apply to a 
small proportion of the dataset where we can infer 
certainty in matches. Algorithms which model 
uncertainty in matching records and incorporate 
probabilistic methods hold promise towards this 
goal; we are currently investigating Monte Carlo 
Markov Chains as a potential approach. We expect 
that the principles underlying Gladyshev and Patel’s 
[2] event bounding approach could have relevance.  
We have observed decreases in the rate of false 
positives with the elimination of a software fault or 
correction of a misconception in semantics. We 
expect that the rate of false positives will decrease 
with further investigation and understanding of the 
index.dat file format. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have investigated two themes 
related to uncertainty in interpreting timestamps. 
Firstly, we investigated whether it is reasonable to 
assume uniform behaviour of computer clocks over 
time, and attempted to characterise how computer 
clocks behave in the wild. Secondly, we investigate 
the feasibility of automatically identifying the 
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temporal behaviour of a computer by correlating 
timestamps embedded in digital evidence with 
corroborative time sources.  
By logging the relationship between system time 
and corresponding civil time, we have identified a 
number of instances where the timescale of three 
computers behaved in anomalous and indeterminate 
ways. We conclude that the interpretation of 
timestamps from digital evidence is complicated by 
the potential for unpredictable temporal variations. 
The implications of this for forensics are clear. 
In cases where establishing the precise time at 
which a computer event occurred is important, one 
cannot assume that computers running MS 
Windows 2000 or XP have behaved in uniform 
ways with respect to keeping time.  
In this study we have focused on the Windows 
platform due to its dominance in deployment. The 
extent to which the results relate to temporal 
behaviour of other operating systems is still an open 
question. The computers in this experiment were 
tethered to a time source where synchronisation 
occurred often. Future work is needed in 
characterising the behaviour of Windows PC’s that 
are either untethered from or loosely tethered to 
reliable time sources.  
Finally, we have investigated the feasibility of 
using a ubiquitous source of timestamps – those 
contained in browser records - as a partial means of 
establishing the temporal behaviour of a computer 
over time. Two algorithms were proposed and 
evaluated, and experimental results were presented 
which demonstrate that both algorithms produce 
outputs which correlate reasonably with the 
timescales of the subject computers. We have 
additionally described how the history correlation 
algorithm could be modified to produce a higher 
rate of true positives. 
There are a number of areas where future work 
is warranted. First, in order that results based on 
this type of correlation may be more clearly 
interpreted and explained in forums such as courts 
of law, a means of qualifying and quantifying the 
error involved would be of use. Second, in order 
that the resolution of the characterised timescales 
may increase, improved algorithms which 
incorporate uncertainty in record matching should 
be investigated. Finally, the Internet Explorer 
index.dat file format is still not fully understood. 
We expect that a clearer understanding of the file 
format would lead to a reduction in errors.  
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